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KAHLER V. KANSAS: THE END OF 
THE INSANITY DEFENSE? 
ERIC ROYTMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, American and English courts refused to assign 
criminal liability to defendants who, because of mental illness, did not 
understand the wrongfulness of their actions. Hundreds of years before 
the Framers were born, English courts widely recognized a mentally ill 
defendant’s right to avoid criminal liability when he lacked moral 
understanding. From the American Revolution to the turn of the 
twenty-first century, courts in every jurisdiction in America widely 
recognized this right as well. 
In 1995, Kansas, along with a small number of other states, passed a 
statute abrogating the widely recognized common law insanity defense. 
At common law, a defendant could raise the defense when a mental 
illness impaired his ability to distinguish right from wrong, allowing him 
to escape liability even when the elements of the crime were otherwise 
fulfilled. However, under Kansas’ statutory scheme, evidence of a 
defendant’s mental illness can only be used to negate the mens rea 
element of the offense. In other words, evidence of mental illness is only 
relevant when it shows that the defendant lacked the intent to commit 
the act itself, regardless of whether he believed that act was moral. In 
Kansas, a defendant driven by mental illness to intentionally harm 
another has no viable path to acquittal at trial, even when his mental 
illness caused him to believe his actions were morally right. 
In Kahler v. Kansas,1 the Supreme Court will consider the 
constitutionality of Kansas’s statutory scheme. The Court’s decision in 
this case will have profound implications for how courts deal with 
defendants struggling with mental illness. A decision to uphold 
Kansas’s statute could be interpreted as a green light for other states to 
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abolish a right that was firmly entrenched in common law long before 
the Court even existed. 
This Commentary will analyze Kansas’s statute in light of the 
Petitioner’s Due Process and Eighth Amendment challenges. Doing so 
requires examining the origins of the insanity defense and the 
importance of moral capacity in the American criminal justice system. 
This Commentary will argue that (1) Kansas’s statute is 
unconstitutional because the Due Process Clause proscribes state 
governments from assigning criminal liability to defendants who 
cannot differentiate right from wrong; and (2) the Eighth Amendment 
does not apply to the statute at issue in this case. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Insanity Defense Law in Kansas 
From 1881 to 1995, defendants in Kansas were able to raise an 
affirmative insanity defense.2 This defense excused a defendant from 
criminal liability “(1) where he does not know the nature and quality 
of his act, or, in the alternative, (2) where he does not know right from 
wrong with respect to that act.”3 If a defendant could affirmatively 
prove either prong of the test, he was excused from liability, whether or 
not the prosecution otherwise proved the elements of the offense.4 
Kansas’s rule was the norm—the affirmative insanity defense was 
available in some form to defendants in every state until 1979.5 
However, in 1995, the Kansas legislature passed a law to restrict 
defendants’ access to the common law insanity defense.6 After a string 
of high-profile cases where defendants were found not guilty by reason 
of insanity, the Kansas legislature sought to make it more difficult for 
defendants to utilize the insanity defense. The legislature decreed that 
mental illness could only be used at trial to show that the defendant 
“lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense 
charged.”7 
 
 2.  Brief for Petitioner at *2, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135 (May 31, 2019) [hereinafter 
Brief for Petitioner]. 
 3.  State v. Baker, 819 P.2d 1173, 1187 (Kan. 1991). 
 4.  See id.  
 5.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *2.  
 6.  Id. at *5. 
 7.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (2010). 
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Under Kansas’s new mens rea scheme, a defendant’s ability to 
distinguish right from wrong has no bearing on his guilt or innocence.8 
Moreover, the defendant can no longer use evidence of mental illness 
affirmatively. After the law passed, the Kansas Supreme Court 
recognized that the legislature had abolished the insanity defense.9 
B. Facts 
Petitioner, James Kahler, has long suffered from obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder, major depressive disorder, and 
narcissistic personality disorder.10 Throughout his adult life, he was 
obsessed with what others thought of him and his family.11 His mental 
illness manifested in exercising meticulous control over his family 
affairs and micro-managing the lives of his wife, Karen, as well as his 
children.12 
In 2008, James Kahler’s life changed drastically.13 The Kahler family 
moved from Texas to Missouri.14 Karen had an extramarital affair with 
her personal trainer and soon filed for divorce.15 As Mr. Kahler’s 
carefully controlled routine fell apart, his mental state also 
deteriorated.16 He was obsessively suspicious that Karen was trying to 
humiliate him.17 He tracked Karen’s phone calls, text messages, and 
social media interactions.18 He stalked his wife and kids.19 His 
obsessions overtook his work life, and he lost his job in 2009.20 Without 
work, he moved back in with his parents at their ranch.21 Kahler 
increasingly focused all of his rage on his wife and daughters, believing 
they were the sole cause of his failure.22 
 
 8.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *5. 
 9.  State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 844 (Kan. 2003); see also State v. Jorrick, 4 P.3d 610, 617 
(Kan. 2000) (“Kansas is among a minority of states that have done away with the insanity and 
diminished capacity defenses.”). 
 10.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *6–7. 
 11.  Id. at *7. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. at *7–8. 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id. at *8. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id. at *9. 
 22.  Id.  
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Mr. Kahler’s devolving mental state reached a critical point during 
Thanksgiving of 2009.23 On Friday, November 27, Kahler’s son came to 
stay with Kahler and his paternal grandparents at the ranch.24 Mr. 
Kahler and Karen had planned for their son to have Thanksgiving 
dinner at his maternal grandmother’s house with his mother and sisters 
the next day.25 However, on Saturday morning, Kahler’s son called 
Karen and asked if he could remain with his father for an additional 
day.26 Karen refused.27 While Mr. Kahler was out cashing a paycheck, 
his son returned to his maternal grandmother’s house to celebrate 
Thanksgiving with his mother and sisters.28 
When Mr. Kahler arrived home to find his son gone, he 
“snapped.”29 He drove to his ex-mother-in-law’s house with several 
loaded rifles.30 He entered the home in a fit of rage, shouting expletives, 
and shot his wife, her mother, and his daughters.31 Kahler’s son ran out 
the back door unharmed.32 Police found Mr. Kahler walking down a 
country road the next day, and he submitted to arrest without protest.33 
C. Proceedings Below 
Before Mr. Kahler’s capital murder trial, he requested jury 
instructions that would mandate acquittal if he proved that, because of 
his mental illness, he did not understand that his actions were wrong.34 
The trial court denied the request, finding that the instructions were 
prohibited by the governing statute.35 At trial, the judge instructed the 
jury that Mr. Kahler’s mental illness was only relevant if it affected his 
intent to kill.36 The jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death.37 
 
 23.  Id. at *9–10. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. Mr. Kahler’s actions are undeniably heinous. However, this Commentary focuses on 
the facts of Mr. Kahler’s mental illness and the Due Process that should be afforded to all 
defendants suffering from mental illnesses.  
 34.  Id. at *11. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
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Kahler appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court.38 He argued that 
his conviction violated the Due Process Clause and that his death 
sentence was proscribed by the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment.39 The court rejected both arguments, affirming his 
conviction and sentence.40 Mr. Kahler filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari on September 28, 2018.41 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on March 18, 2019.42 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Insanity Defense 
The insanity defense is a common law fixture older than the United 
States itself. As early as the fourteenth century, English courts regularly 
applied the “good and evil” test, which excused a defendant from 
criminal liability when his mental illness prevented him from 
understanding that his actions were immoral.43 In 1843, the English 
Lords of Justice addressed the issue of legal insanity in M’Naghten’s 
Case.44 The justices incorporated hundreds of years of Anglo-American 
common law, articulating a seminal rule: 
To establish a defence on the ground of insanity it must be clearly 
proved, that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused 
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the 
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; 
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was 
wrong.45 
At the time of the American Revolution, English courts frequently 
excused defendants who, as a result of mental illness, did not 
 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at *11–12. 
 41.  Id. at *1. 
 42.  139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019). 
 43.  See State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 928 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting) (“During 
the reign of Edward II (1307-1321), there was a shift toward recognizing insanity as a complete 
defense, which was perfected by the time of the ascension of Edward III to the throne (1326-
1327).”); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84 (Nev. 2001) (“Legal insanity has been an established 
concept in English common law for centuries.”). See also Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, 
The Origins of the “Right and Wrong” Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent 
Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1234 (1966) 
(“During the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries . . . the ‘good and evil’ test was 
regularly cited by judges and legal commentators.”). 
 44.  M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718. 
 45.  Id. at 722 (emphasis added). 
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understand that their actions were wrong.46 Early American courts 
adopted the English insanity defense, integrating the principle that 
criminal liability required that a defendant had “sufficient memory, 
intelligence, reason and will, to enable him to distinguish between right 
and wrong . . . .”47 
On several occasions, the Supreme Court recognized the 
fundamental nature of an insanity defense that excuses those who, as a 
result of mental illness, do not appreciate the moral nature of their 
actions. In Morissette v. United States, the Court observed that the 
requirement that criminal defendants possess an “evil-meaning mind      
. . . took deep and early root in American soil.”48 In Penry v. Lynaugh, 
the Court held that “it was well settled at common law that [mentally 
ill defendants] were not subject to punishment for criminal acts 
committed under those incapacities.”49 
As American jurisprudence evolved, the common law yielded 
several different variations of the insanity defense. These included 
cognitive incapacity, where the defendant cannot appreciate the nature 
of his actions; volitional incapacity, where the defendant cannot control 
his actions; and the product-of-mental-illness test, where the 
defendant’s actions were the product of mental disease or defect.50 
Underlying all of these variations was the unifying concept espoused in 
the original “good and evil” test: a defendant cannot be criminally 
liable when, as a result of mental defect, he does not understand his 
actions were wrong. 
While the Court has allowed states the freedom to implement and 
experiment with a variety of insanity defense rules,51 it has never 
expressly permitted a state to ignore the impact of a defendant’s mental 
illness on his understanding of the wrongfulness of his behavior. In 
 
 46.  See Platt & Diamond, supra note 43, at 1236 (“In the eighteenth century, the ‘good and 
evil’ test was regularly used in both insanity and infancy cases.”).  
 47.  See Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310, 326 (1847); see also State v. Spencer, 1846 WL 3316 at 
*202 (N.J. O. & T. 1846) (considering whether the defendant is “capable of moral action and of 
discerning between right and wrong”), People v. Kleim, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13, 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1845) (“The inquiry to be made under the rule of law as now established, was as to the prisoner’s 
knowledge of right and wrong at the time of committing the offense.”), Commonwealth v. Rogers, 
48 Mass. 500, 501–02 (1844) (holding that when a defendant cannot “distinguish between right 
and wrong . . . he is not responsible for such act”), State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43, 48 (1841) (holding 
that the insanity defense requires that a defendant is “incapable of judging between right and 
wrong”). 
 48.  342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952). 
 49.  492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 50.  Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749 (2006). 
 51.  See id. at 752 (“[T]he insanity rule . . . is substantially open to state choice.”).  
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Clark v. Arizona, the state passed a statute prohibiting defendants from 
arguing that their mental illness caused cognitive incapacity.52 The 
Court found that Arizona’s scheme was “constitutionally adequate[,]” 
in part because the state still allowed defendants to argue that they did 
not know that their actions were wrong.53 The Court noted that it has 
long been understood that the cognitive incapacity defense is merely a 
subcategory of the larger moral incapacity rule.54 
B. Due Process 
The Fourteenth Amendment states: “No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”55 The Court 
generally defers to the states in matters of criminal law.56 However, a 
state criminal law still violates the Due Process Clause when it “offends 
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of 
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”57 The Court looks to “the 
teachings of history” and a “solid recognition of the basic values that 
underlie our society” when determining whether legal principles are 
fundamental and deeply rooted.58 
C. The Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”59 In determining which punishments qualify as cruel and 
unusual, the Court has applied two different forms of analyses: (1) 
founding-era analysis60 and (2) proportionality analysis.61 
 
 52.  Id. at 748. 
 53.  See id. at 753 (Noting that “cognitive incapacity is itself enough to demonstrate moral 
incapacity” because, “if a defendant did not know what he was doing when he acted, he could not 
have known that he was performing . . . [a] wrongful act.”). 
 54.  See id. at 754 (Noting the “long-accepted understanding that the cognitively 
incapacitated are a subset of the morally incapacitated.”).  
 55.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 56.  Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977). 
 57.  Id. at 201–02 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)). 
 58.  Moore v. Cty. of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1972) (quoting Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J. concurring)).  
 59.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 60.  See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment bans “modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at 
the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted”). 
 61.  See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) (holding that the punishment for 
crime should be “graduated and proportioned to the offense”) (quoting Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).  
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Under the founding-era analysis, the Eighth Amendment bans 
“those practices condemned by the common law in 1789.”62 Thus, 
punishments that “a reader at the time of the Eighth Amendment’s 
adoption” would have considered cruel and unusual are proscribed.63 
Proportionality analysis is based on the “precept of justice that 
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] 
offense.”64 To determine whether a particular punishment is 
proportional to the offense, the Court examines “objective indicia of 
society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state 
practice.”65 The Court also exercises its independent judgment, 
considering factors such as the Court’s prior precedents,66 the 
offender’s culpability, and penological goals served by the challenged 
sentence.67 
III. HOLDING 
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Kahler’s conviction and 
sentence, citing its prior holding in State v. Bethel.68 In Bethel, the 
Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the affirmative insanity defense 
was “not so ingrained in [Kansas’s] legal system” as to be considered 
fundamental, and that Kansas’s mens rea approach survived Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny because it “does not expressly or effectively 
make mental disease a criminal offense.”69 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
Petitioner makes two core assertions: (1) Kansas’s statute violates 
the Due Process Clause by eliminating the insanity defense, and (2) 
Kansas’s statutory scheme constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.70 
 
 62.  Ford, 477 U.S at 399. 
 63.  Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1123 (2019). 
 64.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 48. 
 65.  Id. at 61.  
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 67. 
 68.  State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 378 (Kan. 2018).  
 69.  State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 851–52 (2003).  
 70.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *12 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 
(2002)).   
KAHLER V. KANSAS (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2020  10:27 AM 
2020] KAHLER V. KANSAS 51 
First, Petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause requires a legal 
path of excuse for defendants who, by nature of their mental illness, 
lack moral culpability.71 Petitioner supports this claim through a 
historical analysis of the insanity defense in ancient cultures, the 
English common law, and the American legal tradition.72 Petitioner 
points out that several religious holy books and ancient Greek 
philosophers all discuss the need to excuse those who lack moral 
capacity.73 Further, academic legal giants in English common law—such 
as Coke and Blackstone—argued that criminal liability required moral 
understanding.74 Turning to American common law, Petitioner points 
out that most jurisdictions in America have maintained some sort of 
insanity defense since the Founding and that forty-five out of fifty 
states still provide an affirmative insanity defense today.75 After 
establishing these fundamental standards, Petitioner argues that 
Kansas’s statutory scheme violates the Due Process Clause by 
eliminating the insanity defense and assigning liability to people 
without moral culpability.76 
Second, Petitioner argues that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment prohibits criminal punishment of people 
who, by reason of insanity, lack moral culpability.77 Citing the 
widespread acceptance of the insanity defense in American common 
law since the Founding,78 Petitioner argues that criminal punishment of 
the insane was “condemned by the common law in 1789” and that “a 
reader at the time of the Eight Amendment’s adoption” would have 
deemed criminal punishment of the insane to be cruel and unusual.79 
Petitioner also argues that criminal punishment of the insane is grossly 
disproportionate because it serves no penological purpose.80 Finally, 
 
 71.  See id. (“The Constitution requires states to provide some mechanism to excuse criminal 
defendants whose mental states render them blameless.”).  
 72.  See id. at *18–29. 
 73.  See id. at *18–20 (“Ancient civilizations recognized the distinction between the insane 
and those capable of understanding the moral implications of their actions. In the early Jewish 
tradition, ‘madness’ was an excuse for otherwise punishable crimes.”). 
 74.  See id. at *21–22 (“Lunatics or infants . . . are incapable of committing any crime; unless 
in such cases where they show a consciousness of doing wrong.”).  
 75.  See id. at *14, *28 (citing State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 996 (Mont. 1984)).   
 76.  See id. at *39 (“Kansas’s ‘mens rea approach’ violates the Constitution.”). 
 77.  See id. at *29. ([T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from punishing a criminal 
defendant without regard to his ability—as a result of mental illness—to rationally appreciate that 
his actions are wrong.”). 
 78.  See id. (citing numerous cases). 
 79.  See id. (citing Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1123 (2019) and Ford v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986)).   
 80.  Id. at *14. 
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Petitioner argues that assigning any criminal liability whatsoever to 
people who cannot tell the difference between right and wrong is cruel 
and unusual punishment in itself.81 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
Respondent argues that (1) Kansas’s mens rea approach does not 
violate the Due Process Clause, and (2) Kansas’s statutory scheme does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment.82 
First, Respondent argues that no particular insanity test is deeply 
rooted in the American legal tradition, as the Court noted in Clark.83 
Respondent points out that many different tests for insanity have been 
used at common law, including Kansas’s mens rea approach.84 When a 
principle is not “deeply rooted” in the American legal tradition, the 
Court typically interprets the Due Process Clause deferentially to avoid 
interfering with individual states’ administration of justice.85 
Respondent believes the Court should apply this deferential approach 
here.86 
Respondent then argues that consideration of a defendant’s ability 
to distinguish right from wrong is not deeply rooted in the American 
legal tradition.87 Pointing to criminal punishments of religious terrorists 
and murderers of abortion doctors, Respondent asserts that society can 
reasonably find individuals blameworthy regardless of whether they 
understand the wrongness of their actions.88 Thus, states are free to 
punish those who do not understand that their actions are wrong.89 
 
 81.  See id. at *29 (“Whether viewed through the Founding-era lens or the modern 
proportionality lens, the Eight Amendment prohibits a State from punishing a criminal defendant 
without regard to his ability—as a result of mental illness—to rationally appreciate that his actions 
are wrong.”). 
 82.  Brief for Respondent at *14, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135 (Aug. 2, 2019) [hereinafter 
Brief for Respondent]. 
 83.  See id. at *15 (“As this Court has previously recognized, the Due Process Clause does 
not mandate that States adopt any one particular approach to insanity.”). 
 84.  See id. at *32 (“Historically, a variety of tests . . . have been used to define insanity.”). 
 85.  See id. at *39 (“States have the freedom to determine whether, and to what extent, 
mental illness should excuse criminal behavior.”). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See id. at *16 (“It is a longstanding principle that knowledge of the law is not required 
for criminal culpability.”).  
 88.  Id. at *40–41.  
 89.  See id. at *40 (“The fact that someone does not understand that what they are doing is 
morally wrong does not render them blameless.”). 
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Second, Respondent argues that Kansas’s statutory scheme does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment.90 The Eighth Amendment applies 
to modes of punishment, not modes of liability.91 Since Kansas’s mens 
rea approach addresses only liability and not punishment, the Eighth 
Amendment has no bearing on it.92 
Respondent then argues that even if the Eighth Amendment did 
apply to the statute at issue, Kansas’s statute does not constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment.93 Respondent supports this claim by arguing 
that the mens rea requirement and the insanity defense have been 
historically intertwined.94 Thus, Kansas’s approach would have been 
acceptable to readers at the time of the Eighth Amendment’s 
adoption.95 Respondent also argues that the mens rea approach does 
serve penological purposes.96 
Finally, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment 
claim is not properly before the Court because Petitioner did not make 
an identical argument before the Kansas Supreme Court.97 Petitioner 
disputed his sentence—rather than his liability—on Eighth 
Amendment grounds in the Kansas Supreme Court.98 Pointing out that 
the Court has previously refused to consider issues that were not raised 
below, Respondent argues that the Court should refuse to consider 
Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim on either jurisdictional or 
prudential grounds.99 
 
 90.  Id. at *45.  
 91.  See id. at *47 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment only applies to bar certain punishments; it 
does not constrain the substance of state criminal liability, including what affirmative defenses 
States must make available.”).  
 92.  See id.  
 93.  Id. at *49. 
 94.  See id. (“[I]nsanity was historically equated with a lack of mens rea.”). 
 95.  See id. (“[T]he mens rea approach to insanity would not have been considered cruel and 
unusual at the time of the Founding.”). 
 96.  See id. at *50. (“Nor is the mens rea approach inconsistent with any of the criminal law 
purposes that Kahler identifies . . .”).  
 97.  See id. at *45 (“In his briefs before the Kansas Supreme Court, Kahler did not argue that 
Kansas’s mens rea approach to insanity violates the Eighth Amendment. As a result, the Kansas 
Supreme Court did not address this issue. Thus, Kahler’s Eighth Amendment claim is not 
properly before this Court.”). 
 98.  Id. at *46. 
 99.  See id. At *47 (“Because this Court is a court of review, not of first view, it should refuse 
to consider this issue, regardless of whether the rule is jurisdictional or prudential.”) (internal 
citations omitted).  
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V. ANALYSIS 
A.  Respondent’s mens rea scheme violates the Due Process Clause. 
The Due Process Clause protects principles of justice that are so 
deeply rooted in the American legal conscience as to be considered 
fundamental.100 Kansas’s scheme violates the deeply rooted principle 
that criminal liability cannot be assigned to a defendant who, as a result 
of mental illness, lacks the capacity to understand that his actions were 
wrong.101 This underlying principle is the foundation upon which all 
subsequent variations of the insanity defense rest. As the Court 
recognized in Clark, cognitive incapacity is merely a “subset” of the 
original “right from wrong” test.102 In this way, the ability to 
differentiate right from wrong is the due process foundation that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects. States are free to build on that 
foundation by implementing whatever additional versions of the 
insanity defense they prefer. But the Due Process Clause forbids states 
from removing that foundation entirely. 
Respondent’s so-called “mens rea approach” to insanity does not 
account for the defendant’s moral capacity at all. As applied in criminal 
law today, mens rea focuses on the defendant’s specific intent to commit 
particular actions that the state considers to be criminal, ignoring 
whether the defendant judges those actions to be wrong.103 Thus, in 
Kansas, a defendant may be guilty of murder if he knowingly or 
intentionally kills someone, regardless of whether he believed his 
killing to be morally justified. This distinction demonstrates that mens 
rea and moral capacity are fundamentally different concepts. Mens rea 
involves the defendant’s intent to commit an action.104 Conversely, 
moral capacity involves the defendant’s ability to evaluate whether that 
 
 100.  Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977). 
 101.  See State v. Spencer, 1846 WL 3316 (N.J. O. & T. 1846) (considering whether the 
defendant is “capable of moral action and of discerning between right and wrong”); People v. 
Kleim, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13, 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (“The inquiry to be made under the rule of 
law as now established, was as to the prisoner’s knowledge of right and wrong at the time of 
committing the offense.”); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. 500, 501–02 (1844) (holding that 
when a defendant cannot “distinguish between right and wrong . . . he is not responsible for such 
act”); State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43, 48 (1841) (holding that the insanity defense requires that a 
defendant is “incapable of judging between right and wrong”). 
 102.  See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 754 (2006) (Noting the “long-accepted understanding 
that the cognitively incapacitated are a subset of the morally incapacitated.”). 
 103.  See ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards 337 (1989) (“[M]ens rea 
terminology has come to refer to the specific state of mind required for the conviction of particular 
criminal offenses.”). 
 104.  Id. 
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action was right or wrong. For hundreds of years, American 
jurisdictions have contemplated both factors when assigning criminal 
liability. Kansas only contemplates one. 
Respondent argues that the mens rea approach is merely an 
alternative insanity defense, rather than an outright abolition.105 This 
argument misses the mark for three reasons. First, the deeply rooted 
principle at the base of the insanity defense is the necessity of excusing 
people who cannot differentiate right from wrong.106 Thus, a statutory 
scheme that contradicts this baseline principle is not an insanity 
defense of any kind. Second, the Kansas legislature quite literally 
passed the statute in question for the purpose of eliminating the 
insanity defense.107 Third, the Kansas Supreme Court has repeatedly 
identified this statutory scheme for what it is—an abolition of the 
insanity defense.108 
Consider the example of a man who killed his friend because, as a 
result of schizophrenia, he believed that his friend would soon commit 
a deadly terrorist act. This man undoubtedly has the requisite mens rea 
for murder—the killing was intentional. However, a mental illness 
caused the man to believe that his intentional actions were morally just. 
In nearly all jurisdictions throughout Anglo-American common law 
history, this individual would have had the chance to avoid criminal 
liability by proving that mental illness prevented him from grasping the 
wrongfulness of his actions. Not so in Kansas. Instead, Respondent’s 
scheme renders evidence of moral incapacity resulting from mental 
illness irrelevant, and thus inadmissible. Indeed, Mr. Kahler originally 
asked the trial court to allow him to argue that his delusions about his 
family prevented him from fully understanding the wrongfulness of his 
actions. The trial court denied the request because it found that 
Kansas’s statute rendered such arguments irrelevant. Mr. Kahler had 
the requisite mens rea by intending to kill his victims, which his mental 
illness did not negate, so his illness played no further part. In short, this 
 
 105.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 82, at *9 (“While Kansas no longer has an 
affirmative defense called insanity, evidence of mental disease or defect is still admissible to show 
a lack of mens rea, thus exempting certain mentally ill individuals from criminal liability.”). 
 106.  See sources cited supra note 101.  
 107.  See State v. Jorrick, 4 P.3d 610, 617 (Kan. 2000) (“Kansas . . . legislatively abolished the 
insanity defense.”). 
 108.  See id. (“Kansas is among a minority of states that have done away with the insanity and 
diminished capacity defenses.”); see also State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 844 (2003) (“The insanity 
defense . . . has been abolished in Kansas . . . .”).  
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approach disregards the defendant’s inability to differentiate right from 
wrong. Respondent admits as much.109 
Furthermore, evidence of mental illness rarely refutes mens rea in 
the first place.110 Indeed, Justice Breyer has recognized that refutation 
of mens rea “depends not on moral responsibility but on empirical 
fact.”111 Because mental illnesses typically impact moral responsibility 
rather than the intent to act, evidence of such illnesses usually does very 
little to disprove mens rea.112 “[A] man who commits murder because 
he feels compelled by demons still possesses the mens rea required for 
murder.”113 In other words, the mens rea approach offers mentally ill 
defendants about as much protection in trial as an umbrella made out 
of tissue paper offers in a thunderstorm. A statutory scheme cannot 
qualify as a version of the insanity defense when it rarely protects 
mentally ill defendants and is categorically unrelated to mental illness. 
Relying on Clark, Respondent points out that the Court has held 
that no particular insanity test is deeply rooted, and thus, Respondent 
is entitled to deference when implementing criminal insanity policies.114 
This argument is also unavailing. True, the Clark Court held that “due 
process imposes no single canonical formulation of legal insanity,” 
giving states the freedom to choose among a number of historically 
utilized insanity tests.115 However, the Clark court did not hold that any 
criminal insanity policy would be constitutional and it did not permit 
states to ignore defendants’ moral understanding of their actions.116 In 
fact, the Court in Clark held that Arizona’s curtailing of its insanity 
defense was “constitutionally adequate” in part because Arizona still 
allowed defendants to obtain acquittal by proving moral incapacity 
 
 109.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 82, at *47 (“Convicting those who . . . do not recognize 
their actions are wrong, is not cruel and unusual.”). 
 110.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *5 (“[M]oral or rational defects almost never negate 
even the narrowest criminal states of mind.”).  
 111.  Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 791 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 112.  Brief of American Psychiatric Association, American Psychological Association, 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental 
Health Law, and Mental Health America as Amici Curiae at 25, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135 
(June 7, 2019) (“The clinical experience of mental health professionals, as well as the peer-
reviewed scientific literature, support the conclusion that severe mental illness can seriously 
impair an individual’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct.”). 
 113.  United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1987).  
 114.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 82, at *39.  
 115.  Clark, 548 U.S. at 749. 
 116.  See id. at 754 (Holding that a state’s insanity defense rule was “constitutionally 
adequate” in part because it allowed defendants to present evidence of “moral incapacity”). 
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resulting from mental illness.117 By eliminating the foundational 
principle that defendants must know right from wrong to be criminally 
liable, Respondent goes beyond what Clark and the Fourteenth 
Amendment allow. 
B. The Eighth Amendment does not apply to the statute at issue in this 
case. 
The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment 
has no bearing on the law at issue because Kansas’s statute does not 
address punishment. The Eighth Amendment applies to “modes or acts 
of punishment . . . . “118 Justice Scalia noted that, at a minimum, for a 
statute to be subject to the Eighth Amendment’s restrictions, it must 
impose a “particular mode[] of punishment.”119 Kansas’s statute does 
not. It solely addresses the kinds of arguments a defendant can make 
at trial. It does not criminalize any activity, and it does not prescribe a 
sentence. The Eighth Amendment bans cruel and unusual punishments, 
not trial mechanics, criminal proceedings, or other functions of the 
criminal justice system. To the extent that these other functions treat 
defendants in a cruel and unusual way, the Due Process Clause is the 
proper constitutional shield. As explained in Section I, this is exactly 
the case here. 
Relying on Robinson v. California, Petitioner argues that a mere 
felony conviction, regardless of subsequent sentencing, constitutes 
punishment subject to the Eighth Amendment.120 Thus, a statute that 
establishes liability may still qualify as cruel and unusual punishment.121 
This is true. However, this reasoning does not make the Eighth 
Amendment any more applicable to the statute at issue here. Kansas’s 
statute does not establish liability. It does not criminalize any act. 
Furthermore, Petitioner’s reliance on Robinson is misplaced. The 
Robinson Court struck down a state statute that made it illegal for 
someone to be addicted to narcotics and mandated a ninety-day prison 
 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 119.  See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 958 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“[T]he 
Americans who adopted the Eighth Amendment intended its Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause as a check on the ability of the Legislature to authorize particular modes of punishment—
i.e., cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed.”).  
 120.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *29 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 
(1962)). 
 121.  See id. 
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sentence.122 In that case, the Court held that criminalizing someone’s 
status as an addict constituted cruel and unusual punishment.123 That 
decision is not analogous to this case. Kansas’s statute does not make it 
a crime to be mentally ill. It merely governs what arguments a 
defendant can make at trial when they are accused of violating a 
different statute entirely. There is a difference between statutes that 
punish behavior and statutes that set the rules for trial. The former falls 
under the Eighth Amendment’s restrictions; the latter does not. A 
statue cannot constitute cruel and unusual punishment when it does 
not punish. 
Mr. Kahler may very well be correct that his death sentence serves 
no penological purpose. He may be correct that sending mentally ill 
defendants to prison in general serves no penological purpose. But Mr. 
Kahler was not convicted because he has a mental illness. He was 
convicted because he committed a murder. Mr. Kalher’s arguments 
may support the Eighth Amendment reversal of his individual 
sentence, which is not at issue here, but not of an entire statute that 
bears little relationship to punishment. 
CONCLUSION 
In Kahler v. Kansas, the Court has the opportunity to clarify a clear 
Due Process Clause standard for the insanity defense. The Court should 
use this opportunity to formally recognize a bedrock criminal law 
principle that has been entrenched in the American legal tradition for 
generations: the Constitution prohibits states from assigning criminal 
liability to people whose mental illness prevents them from 
understanding the wrongfulness of their actions. This is the 
constitutional due process foundation upon which the insanity defense 
should rest. Such a decision would do right by defendants, the criminal 
justice system, and the Constitution itself. 
 
 
 122.  See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661–667.  
 123.  Id. at 666–667.  
